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INTRODUCTION 
This case tu rns on the interpretation of the Metropolitan insurance 
policy. State Farm has admitted that if this court finds no coverage under the 
Metropolitan policy, it will pay the damages to which Amy Echard Otto, the 
plaintiff in the underlying action, is entitled under the uninsured motorist 
provisions of its policy. If the court finds coverage under the Metropolitan 
policy, Metropolitan will respond to the plaintiffs claims. 
Whether the Metropolitan policy covers the claim t u r n s on an 
interpretation of the insuring agreement which provides, in pertinent part: 
We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage 
to others for which the law holds an insured responsible 
because of an occurrence which results from the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a covered automobile or a non-owned 
automobile. 
(R. 347-348, 360.) (Appellant's Brief, Tab 2.) Coverage in this case depends on 
two requirements of this insuring agreement. Thor Wixom would have to have 
been an (1) "insured" driving a (2) "non-owned automobile." The issue of 
whether he was an "insured" was covered in the opening briefs. This Reply 
Brief will concentrate on the issue of whether Thor Wixom was driving a "non-
owned automobile." 
Summary judgment for State Farm was improper. The record is clear 
that Thor Wixom was not driving a "non-owned automobile." At best for State 
Farm, the record shows that genuine issues of material fact remained to be 
determined, and that the District Court could not have entered summary 
judgment for State Farm without improperly adjudicating these facts. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THAT THOR WIXOM MET 
POLICY REQUIREMENTS FOR DRIVING A " N O N - O W N E D 
AUTOMOBILE." 
To find coverage under the Metropolitan policy, the trial court would 
necessarily have had to made a finding that the car Thor Wixom was driving 
in the accident qualified as a "non-owned automobile" as described in the 
Metropolitan policy. It was not. To the extent prior briefing has not fully 
developed this issue, this reply memorandum will explain why Thor Wixom did 
not meet the requirements for a "non-owned automobile" because he was 
driving a car that was available for his regular use. 
1. THE CAR THOR WIXOM DROVE IN THE ACCIDENT WAS SO REGULARLY 
AVAILABLE THAT THIS COURT CAN DECIDE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT 
THE CAR WAS AVAILABLE FOR HIS REGULAR USE AND THEREFORE DID NOT 
QUALIFY AS A "NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE." 
The car Thor Wixom was driving in this accident cannot meet the 
requirements as a non-owned automobile because it was regularly available 
for his use . The facts are so clear that reasonable minds can draw no other 
conclusion. Thor Wixom had parked his car at least two weeks before the 
accident and there is nothing in the record to show that he drove any other 
vehicle during this two-week period before the accident. (R. 380-381, 383.) 
Whenever he was in a car, this is the one he drove. The record shows no 
limitations on when he had the car available to him except for the times when 
its owner, his fiance, was using it. (R. 380.) At one point in the record, he 
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remembered that he used the car about seven times in the two weeks before 
the accident. (R. 384.) 
The policy language which mus t be met for the car Thor Wixom was 
driving to be "non-owned automobile" is clear: 
"non-owned automobile" means an automobile which is 
neither owned by, furnished to, nor made available for 
regular use to you or any resident in your household. 
(R. 348, 368; Appellant's Brief, Tab 2.) Under this policy provision, Thor 
Wixom has no coverage if he was driving a car "made available for regular use" 
by him. 
State Farm argues that the test under this policy language is actual use 
of the car. It is not. A more careful reading shows that the test is whether the 
car is "available for regular use" of the person seeking coverage. Actual use 
can prove availability because to be used, the car had to be available. The car 
can also be available on other occasions whether it is actually used or not. 
Contrary to the erroneous finding of fact the trial court would have 
been required to reach, the car Thor Wixom was driving at the time this 
accident was available for his regular use. At the time of the accident, the car 
Thor Wixom was driving was garaged at the home where Thor Wixom was 
living. (R. 377.) Although Thor Wixom owned a car of his own, he had 
canceled his insurance and was not driving his car. (R. 380-81.) The record 
reveals no other car being available to Thor during the two-week period before 
the accident. 
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The only limitation to vehicle availability in the record is that the car 
was not available when Thor Wixom's fiance was using it. (R. 378.) Even 
then, Thor often drove the car when the couple was together. (R. 382.) In his 
deposition, Thor Wixom recalled "maybe seven times" he had driven his 
fiance's car in the two weeks before the accident. (R. 382.) 
In short, the record reflects that the car made available to Thor Wixom 
on the date of the accident was the only car he had available to him in the 
two weeks before the accident. (R. 381-83.) Nothing indicates he was ever 
told he could not drive the car. (R. 381.) Thus, it was fully available for his 
regular use. (R. 381-83.) The only real limitation, according to the record, is 
when his fiamce was driving the car. (R. 380.) Even then, he testified that he 
sometimes drove. (R. 384.) The availability of Thor Wixom's fiance's car was 
so regular that this court can find, as a matter of law, that the car Thor Wixom 
was driving at the time of the accident was available for his regular use. He 
used it regularly. Even during times he was not using it, it was available for 
his regular use. 
2 . GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAINED REGARDING WHETHER 
THE CAR WAS A "NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE." 
Because this is an appeal from a grant of a motion for summary 
judgment , the existence of a factual dispute requires reversal. Wilcox v 
Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 368 (Utah 1996). This court need apply no 
deference to the trial court 's conclusion that there were no issues of fact 
precluding summary judgment. Id. 
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In this case, the statements upon which State Farm relies came from a 
deposition taken before Metropolitan was made a party to this action. (R. 
375.) Because Metropolitan was not a party, it had no counsel present at Thor 
Wixom's deposition. (R. 376.) In fact, the only counsel present at Thor 
Wixom's deposition were the two lawyers whose clients can benefit from 
coverage under the Metropolitan policy: State Farm's counsel Erik K. 
Davenport, and underlying plaintiff Amy Echard Otto's father and counsel 
Robert A. Echard. (R. 376.) 
Under leading questioning, Thor Wixom at one point agreed with 
counsel's testimony that his use had not been "on a regular basis." (R. 329-
330) State Farm's reliance on this isolated testimony is misplaced. As 
explained in the preceding subsection of this brief, availability for use is the 
issue, not the frequency that the use has exercised. In summary, the record, 
as a whole, supports Metropolitan's view that it was entitled to summary 
judgment because Thor Wixom was driving a car that was available for his 
regular use. Because it was available for his regular use, it does not meet the 
requirement for a non-owned automobile, as that term is used in the policy. If 
there is any question from the record on appeal, we have a factual 
determination which, at the very least, would manda te reversal of the 
summary judgment granted to State Farm Insurance. 
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B. UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. THE "AVAILABLE FOR REGULAR 
USE" LANGUAGE IN METROPOLITAN'S POLICY IS UNAMBIGUOUS. 
State Farm cites Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co. v. 
Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254 (Utah App. 1988), vacated on rehearing, Metropolitan 
Property & Liability Insurance Co. v. Finlayson, 766 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1989), 
for the proposition that because language similar to Metropolitan's "available 
for regular use" language was ambiguous under one set of facts, it mus t be 
ambiguous here too. This is incorrect. First, Finlayson has been vacated. 
Second, ambiguity mus t be determined in light of the facts of the case. A 
provision found to be ambiguous under one set of facts can be unambiguous 
under another. 
In Overson v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty, 587 P.2d 149 (Utah 
1978), the court considered a claim tha t an insurance provision was 
ambiguous and therefore required coverage. The party seeking coverage cited 
a number of cases, all finding ambiguity in a policy provision similar to that at 
issue in the case. Id. at 150. The court ruled that these cases were not 
controlling because they were decided under different facts. The court found 
it important tha t "each case cited addresses close factual questions, not 
present here." Id. See also, Jacobson v Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 652 P.2d 909, 
911 (Utah 1982) (facts of case made ambiguity a non-issue). 
This rule applies to the case before this court. A finding of ambiguity 
under the facts of Finlayson does not translate to a finding of ambiguity of 
similar language under the facts of this case. Finlayson loses any vitality it 
had when State Farm attempts to stretch it beyond its facts. As was more 
€ 
fully briefed in Metropolitan's initial brief, under either of the claimed 
definitions of regular use availability discussed in Finlayson, there would be 
no coverage under the facts of Thor Wixom's use of his fiance's car. Under the 
facts of Thor Wixom's case, the policy is unambiguous. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there is no coverage under the Metropolitan policy 
without a showing that Thor Wixom comes within the insuring agreement of 
that policy. That insuring agreement requires that: 1) Thor Wixom be an 
insured; and 2) that he be driving a vehicle which qualifies as a non-owned 
automobile. The car Thor Wixom was driving cannot be a non-owned 
automobile because it was available for Thor Wixom's regular use. Because 
reasonable minds could not differ on this, this court should be able to find 
that there was no coverage under Metropolitan's policy. If there is a factual 
dispute, it will at very least mandate reversal of the summary judgment 
granted to State Farm Insurance. 
DATED this 10th day of June , 1998. /; 
% & DUI 
RAND HIRSCHI 
CLINTON D. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant Metropolitan 
Property & Casualty Insurance 
Company 
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